Human Rights and Us Foreign Policy: Prevarications and Evasions by Clair Apodaca

Author:Clair Apodaca [Apodaca, Clair]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Political Science, General, Human Rights
ISBN: 9781351205818
Google: scaWDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 52329782
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-05-08T09:59:29+00:00

Bureaucratic Policymaking and the Presidential Agenda

Katyal (2006) believes that during the Bush Administration the political model of governance was legislative abdication whereby the executive branch rather than the legislative branch was making the law. The separation of powers was no longer between the executive and the legislative branches but between the different executive agencies. Civil servants and issue experts who are beholden to no administration populate the bureaucracy. Political appointees, on the other hand, are generally less experienced but are loyal to the president, often seeking to advance his agenda. Katyal (2006) explains the virtues of internal divisions among the agencies within the executive bureaucracy. These agencies have differing missions and goals and must negotiate in order to fulfill a vague and abstract presidential objective. Katyal writes: “because each department serves a different core constituency, the overlap should produce internal checks” and, in theory, produce the best policy option (2006: 2326). The entrenched bureaucracy is viewed as a benevolent constraining force to an otherwise imperial presidency providing an internal separation of powers when the Congress falls short. However, this assumption only works if the differing agencies hold similar power and prestige. In the realm of foreign policy, and in particular in foreign aid policy, the DOD certainly holds greater power and resources than does the USAID or even the DOS. General David Barno, Commander of the Combined U.S. Forces 2003–2005, was reported as saying “The war seemed to be between Defense and State and not the US and the Taliban. The bureaucratic turf battles back in Washington were tangible, they were extraordinary” (as quoted in Keane and Wood 2016). As history has shown, the negotiations over aid projects and programs are one-sided, favoring the DOD.

The growth in the use of political appointments and the mistrust of the bureaucracy stems from the perception that the bureaucracy seeks to implement its own agenda, often at the expense of presidential goals. Thus, in order to achieve its objectives and to control the bureaucracy, the president would appoint loyalists rather than experts to key positions. Bureaucrats whose loyalty to the president was uncertain would be transferred, pressured to resign, or excluded from the decision-making process. Moynihan and Roberts write that “Efforts to assert tighter political control of the federal bureaucracy, revived during the Ronald Reagan Administration, were pursued to an extreme under Bush. Loyalty triumphed over competence in selection, and political goals displaced rationality in decision making” (2010: 572). Although the politicization of bureaucratic management has a long history in the United States, in the opinion of Moynihan and Roberts, “the Bush administration pushed the doctrine of politicization more aggressively than its predecessors” (2010: 573). For example, Schedule C appointment, a type of political appointments exempt from competitive or merit hiring requirements, was extended for positions that “involve making or approving substantive policy recommendations” or when the

work of the position can be performed successfully only by someone with a thorough knowledge of and sympathy with the goals, priorities, and preferences of an official who

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